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THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
GUBERNATORIAL POWER AND 
PRIVILEGE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
Luther F. Caner, University of Charleston 
Few institutions in American government hav_e undergone the 
abrupt transformation in power and privilege as that reafued by the 
South Carolina governor over the past decade and a half. Still fewer 
institutions began their transformation from such a relative position of 
constitutional and statutory inadequacy. Viewed historically as one of 
the weakest among the chief executives of the 50 states, the office was 
described by V.O. Key in his seminal book Southern Politics in the 
State and Nation as having the "narrowest sort of power of decision of 
State Administration" .1 Other, more recent, studies comparing the 
formal powers of state governors have consistently affirmed the 
structural frailties inherent in the South Carolina executive. These 
studies have identified weak appointment powers, the absence of an 
executive budget, and the inability to organize and reorganize as factors 
which have traditionally curtailed gubernatorial authority and 
prerogative. 2 
Beginning in the early 1980s, executive governance began an 
ascendency to a more visible, recognizable position within the hierarchy 
of state politics . This movement and the events, expectations, and 
cultural manifestations which have accompanied it have led to the 
realization of a dynamic model of gubernatorial centrality and control 
in contemporary South Carolina. The resulting impact on the 
development of substantive policy has been profound, with the 
governor becoming increasingly influential on both ends of the policy 
continuum-initiation and implementation. 
An analysis of this transformation provides a view of a rapidly 
changing state institution and permits the assessment of shifting 
legislative-executive branch authority across a single generation. Just 
as importantly, it affords the opportunity to observe patterns of 
institutional control and accountability emerge in response to a variety 
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of political, economic and social pressures. 
This article will examine these issues and attempt to identify 
causal trends which have bolstered the posture of the executive during 
the last few years. To facilitate the latter, the typologies of political 
culture developed by Daniel Elazar will be employed to explain the 
emerging patterns of gubernatorial authority. 3 
1790-1980: The Symbolic and Hollow Executive 
Historically, South Carolinians have abhorred executive authority. 
As early as 1790, the first constitution of the state provided for the 
legislature to elect the governor, who was restricted to serving a two 
year term and who lacked the authority to control or check legislative 
power. In 1865 the popular election of governor was permitted and 
allowance was made for a gubernatorial veto, although the veto could 
be overridden by a majority vote in both houses of the legislature. 
More expansively, the 1865 constitution made allowance for the 
governor to initiate proposals for laws and it required other executive 
officials to submit information to him upon request. 
The slow and gradual realization of the most symbolic executive 
authority occurred with the passage of the current (1895) Constitution. 
This constitution provided for a true separation of the executive and 
legislative branches and required direct popular election of the 
governor. Uncharacteristic of other southern states, the document did 
make allowance for a line item veto. Characteristic of such states, it 
provided for the "long ballot" election of a myriad of constitutional 
officers with whom the governor would share executive authority. 4 
While the governor was afforded a "chief executive" primacy in the 
document, the other officers were assured autonomy from gubernatorial 
control in their direct relationship to the electorate and the legislature. 
This subjugation of executive authority was both circumspectly 
and artfully constructed. At a time when the majority 
of other states and the federal government were moving toward 
executive centrality5, South Carolina grudgingly allowed for a separate 
executive branch with limited checks over the legislature and power 
diffused among the nine elected executive officials. 
184 / The Journal of Political Science 
Transformation of Gubernatorial Power & Privilege 
This is not to imply that South Carolina was without rebellious 
governors during this time period. The campaign of 1890 between 
"Pitchfork " Ben Tillman and Alexander C. Haskell was extraordinarily 
volatile with the subsequent victor, Tillman, pledging a platform of 
reforms . Tillman biographer Francis Butler Simkins summarized many 
of these as detailed in Tillman's inaugural address in December, 1890: 
Numerous other reforms were advocated. A 
commission should be appointed to examine the 
management of the lunatic asylum. The state 
penitentiary should be self-supporting and , to further 
this end, restrictions on the hiring out of convicts 
should be loosened without surrendering state 
regulation of this labor. He repeated old demands for 
a constitutional convention, the reapportionment of 
seats in the legislature , the abolition of one of 
Charleston's two seats in the Senate, and the 
establishment of a uniform control of the 
administration of local justice. He declared that the 
assessment of taxes by popularly elected officials was 
'an absolute and pitiable failure' and recommended 
centraliz.ation of this function. . . . . 6 
But Simkins noted that his subsequent record of "educational, 
constitutional, and administrative reform (was) so moderate that 
conservative traditions were scarcely violated. "7 Legislative supremacy 
was never seriously challenged . 
The movement into the twentieth century resulted in few changes. 
When the wave of budget reform swept across the Federal and state 
governments between 1910 and 1925, South Carolina ' s response was 
measured and moderate. The U.S. Congress , in the Budget and 
Accounting Act of 1921, provided for the creation of an executive 
budget with all budgetary requests centralized through the president. 
Many state governments adopted similar plans with governors 
controlling the budget submission process. As the ability to recommend 
appropriations is an essential requisite to the ability to propose 
meaningful legislation, these efforts enhanced the chief executive's role 
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both in controlling agencies and in directing the flow of their policy. 
The South Carolina General Assembly, while recognizing the 
virtues of consolidating the budget proposal process, was not willing to 
escalate the governor's profile as an agent for affecting budget or 
policy recommendations. The 1919 compromise provided for the 
creation of a Budget Commission with a membership of three: the 
governor, who served as chairman, the chairman of the Senate Finance 
Committee, and the chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Committee. Ostensibly, this measure provided a deliberative forum for 
the three primary budget actors in the state to · discuss and propose 
fiscal policy. Practically , it ensured that the two legislative members 
would always control the process. 
By mid-century, the powers of this Commission, with the 
governor in the minority, were substantial and included post as well as 
pre-appropriation controls: 
An examination of the minutes (State Budget 
Commission, Minutes) of the last several years of the 
existence of this Commission indicates that it 
exercised extraordinary control over state finances. It 
prepared the state budget, approved or disapproved 
all transfers, set individual state employee salaries, 
approved major equipment acquisitions, allocated a 
significant amount of money out of the civil 
contingent fund for agency expenditures, and had to 
approve all expenditures by agencies that were even 
the slightest bit out of the ordinary. 8 
Thus by 1948 what began as an initiative to permit the governor, 
as one member of three, limited prerogative to propose budgets had 
evolved into a mechanism to provide the General Assembly, as two 
members of three, control of much of the financial operations of 
executive branch agencies, including the governor's own office. The 
imbalance of power became more pronounced. 
In 1950, the State Reorganiz.ation Commission proposed a new 
budget organiz.ation plan to the General Assembly. This plan provided 
for the consolidation of eight state agencies under the old Budget 
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Commission and the addition of two new members, the Treasurer and 
the Comptroller General, to the body itself. This new construct, 
renamed the State Budget and Control Board, was created statutorily 
the same year. Once again, an action taken to affect presumably 
progressive change had resulted in a further diminution of the 
governor's authority. While the new Budget and Control Board was 
comprised of a membership with the executive in the majority, the 
governor now could cast only one vote of five. Moreover, the other 
two executive members were in no way accountable to the governor 
and were, in fact, dependent upon the legislature for appropriations to 
maintain their own offices. 
Governors were realizing no more success in exerting control 
over executive branch operations during this same period. In a highly 
publicized event in the 1930s, Governor Olin D. Johnston, depicted by 
a lowcountry politician as "a young squirt from Spartanburg with a 
labor background" 9 declared a state of rebellion, suspended habeas 
corpus and called out the National Guard in an effort to force the State 
Highway Commission to comply with his edicts. 10 Decades later, 
Governors Robert McNair and John West would work diligently to 
implement desegregation in the state educational systems while relying 
more on persuasion and the symbolic prestige of the executive rather 
than true constitutional or statutory authority. 
When James B. Edwards was inaugurated in 1975, he had direct 
control over the appointment of only two state agency beads: the 
Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division and the Commissioner of 
Labor. The other 168 agency directors and 32 university, college and 
technical college presidents were appointed by and accountable to 
independent boards and commissions. Although the governor at that 
time appointed approximately 1,400 state and regional board and 
commission officials, most served fixed terms varying from two to six 
years. But even if a governor had all appointments affected, he would 
control the governing boards of fewer than a dozen agencies. 11 
Moreover, because the preponderance of members served fixed terms 
with removal only for cause, there were no immediate sanctions for 
defying a gubernatorial edict. 
Beyond appointments and budgets, the greatest constraint on 
executive authority was the constitutional provision that governors could 
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serve a single four year term. 12 Such a restnction was daunting 
enough given the fact that the first year of the term was devoted largely 
to organizational efforts and during the last year the office was 
relegated generally to "lame duck" status. Governors were left with 
only the interim two years to conceptualize, propose, mobilize a viable 
coalition, implement, and evaluate. It is not surprising that governors 
controlled little of the policy process and championed few 
programmatic initiatives. As a lot, their proposals were regarded 
skeptically by their legislative brethren, and frequently they were 
forced to rely on demagoguery to gain any measure of popular support. 
As a consequence, the position was considered generally to be a 
stepping stone to higher office, most notably the U.S. Senate. V.O. 
Key described the situation as it pertained to then Governor Strom 
Thurmond: 
... The institutional structure almost perforce casts the 
governor in the role of popular leadership and drives 
the legislature to a role as defender of the status quo. 
When the governor is independent, ambitious, and 
aggressive, he has a head-on collision with the 
legislature. And, says a senator, governors propose 
ambitious programs, not out of any sincere regard for 
the needs of the people, but as a means to higher 
office. That behavior points to the principle that mass 
welfare can often, and perhaps only, be advanced by 
harnessing to it forces seeking private or personal 
advantage. Governor Thurmond, a senator opined in 
early 1948, "is one of those who is trying to build 
himself up for the Senate and he is full of a program 
of his own and full of things he wants to do, and we 
just naturally come into conflict. " 13 
While such criticism seems harsh, a biographical survey of South 
Carolina governors during the twentieth century reveals that no fewer 
than six were elected subsequently to the U.S. Senate. This datum is 
even more striking when one considers that the two seats have been 
occupied continuously since 1956 and 1966 by Strom Thurmond and 
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Ernest Hollings, respectively. Table One identifies the six governors 
with their gubernatorial and senatorial terms noted. 
With the movement into the latter part of the twentieth century, 
the pos1non remained somnambulant both politically and 
administratively. As to governance potential, it continued to function 
more effectively "as a platform for generating public expectations than 
as an instrument for satisfying such expectations." 14 
1980-Present: The Evolving Executive 
The 1970s became embryonic years for the growth of the 
governor's authority. During the administrations of Robert McNair 
(1965-71) and John West (1971-75) the governor's office was expanded 
substantially as federal funds flowed into the state. Much of the federal 
enabling legislation required the governor to be the state trustee for 
various grant programs, thereby providing him the opportunity to affect 
a broader range of financial decisions. McNair created a Division of 
Planning and Grants to work with legislators and local government 
officials in determining eligibility for grants and making application. 
West structured a Division of Administration through which many of 
these grants were administered. For the first time, governors had 
administrative responsibility for processes beyond their own anteroom. 
James B. Edwards (1975-79), as the first Republican inaugurated 
since Reconstruction, learned quickly the importance of developing and 
selling a nonpartisan agenda in order to mollify the Democrat-
controlled legislature. Relying on such support, Edwards sought to 
overhaul the social services bureaucracy and construct a corporate 
management structure for the Budget and Control Board. 
But the next three administrations truly saw the emergence of the 
authoritative executive. Richard Riley (1979-87), a progressive 
reformist, avidly sought a forum for redefining executive power. He 
employed his staff in this quest, and they were frequently to be found 
in the legislative chambers, lobbying for the Governor's programs. 
Riley was also successful in generating support for a constitutional 
amendment to permit reelection for a second four year term. This 
constitutional change, coupled with Riley's reelection in 1982, 
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Table One: 
Twentieth Century South Carolina Governors 
Subsequently Serving in the U.S. Senate' 
QQyw]Q[ Term as Governor Term in the U.S . Senate 
Coleman L. Blease 1911- 1915 1925-31 
Olin D. Johnston 1935-39; 1943-45 1945-65 
Burnet R. Maybank 1939-41 1941-54 
J. Strom Thurmond 1947-51 1954-56; l 956-present2 
Ernest F. Hollings 1959-63 1966-present 
Donald S. Russell 1963-65 1965-66 
' One governor, James F. Byrnes, served in the U.S . Senate from 1931-41 prior to his 
gubernatorial term from 1951-1955. 
' Strom Thurmond resigned from the Senate in April , 1956 and was reelected in 
November , 1956 
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effectively redefined the power base for the modem governor. No 
longer was he simply a personality to be tolerated for four short years; 
eight years were long enough to propose and implement programs. 
Moreover, the campaign for reelection could be used to secure an 
electoral mandate for a political agenda. Finally, tenure across two 
terms was sufficient to give a governor control over all of the 
appointments to which he was entitled, even those involving fixed, 
staggered terms. 
Riley proceeded to realize these expectations in his successful bid 
to have the Education Improvement Act passed in 1984. What is 
commonly appreciated as his most significant legislative 
accomplishment could. never have been achieved within the scope of a 
single term. Sufficient time would not have existed to align the right 
forces politically, mobilize extensive public support, and negotiate 
enough compromises legislatively to ensure a winning coalition. 
The two terms of Carroll A. Campbell, Jr. (1987-95) expanded 
gubernatorial authority even further. Campbell, an intelligent, 
aggressive Greenville Republican, had served four terms in the U.S. 
House of Representatives on the prestigious Ways and Means 
Committee. He knew national politics, he possessed a keen sense for 
bargaining legislatively, and he was not reticent to use partisan politics 
to the advantage of his governorship. 
In the first term, Campbell carefully but consistently pursued 
opportunities to promote gubernatorial power and prestige. Economic 
development initiatives became his forte, and he developed strong 
rapport with the business leadership of the state. This alliance was 
sustained with every major initiative he brought forth over the eight 
years. 
Campbell also moved to establish more ownership of the 
budgetary process. Lacking statutory authority, he nevertheless sent his 
own executive budget to the Budget and Control Board and the 
legislature in 1988. This process continued for each of the following 
four years. Finally, in 1993, the budgetary statutes were revised to 
allow the governor the authority to solicit agency requests and submit 
an executive budget, annotating his priorities. 
Beyond design, however, circumstances also conspired to enhance 
the gubernatorial base of authority. Hurrir;ane Hugo ravaged the state 
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in September, 1989, and the focal point of response and recovery 
became the governor's office. Campbell nego~ted a substantially 
reduced state match for federal disaster assistance with the Bush 
administration and appointed a blue ribbon recovery commismon with 
two former governors as members. Concurrently, he rejected pleas 
to convene a special legislative session. The implication was obvious: 
the crisis required immediate executive action not legislative 
deliberation. Surprisingly, the legislative leadership concurred with his 
decision and ultimately _the eruJ, vindicated the means. Within a year, 
South Carolina had substantially recovered from a natural catastrophe 
exceeding $7 billion in damages. 
An even heavier pall descended upon the state in 1990 when a 
federal sting operation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
investigated legislative vote buying, violations of the Hobbes Act and 
other state corruption. When the indictments were returned, 28 state 
officials and lobbyists were implicated. All but one were subsequently 
found guilty or pleaded guilty. 1.s 
Two events transpired in the aftermath. The first involved 
extensive legislative dialogue on the necessity for strengthening the 
state's ethics laws. This culminated in the passage of one of the 
strictest ethics laws among the 50 states in September, 1991. Much of 
the regulatory focus in the legislation centered upon the legislator-
lobbyist relationship. 
The second event had more profound implications for executive 
authority and consolidation. Carroll Campbell in his 1991 state of the 
state address demanded a restructuring of state government "ripped 
open by scandal." Within a month, he had signed an executive order 
creating the Commission on Governmental Restructuring, cochaired by 
Lt. Governor Nick Theodore and House Judiciary Chairman David 
Wilkins. This commission met for six months, conducted extensive 
hearings and in September, 1991 recommended a 15 department cabinet 
appointed by the governor. Concurrently, the State newspaper launched 
a series entitled "power failure" which would run into 1992 and 
chronicle many of the dysfunctions of state government. 
In 1992, the General Assembly began considering the reform 
package in earnest. In the House of Representatives, restructuring 
deadlocked and Speaker Bob Sheheen cast the deciding vote for its 
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adoption. The Senate was even more equivocal. Its leadership 
consistently implored Campbell to compromise on various aspects of 
the commission proposal, which he refused to do. Finally, in the 
waning hours of the session, the plan died on a procedural technicality 
without ever coming to a vote. 
Restructuring proponents began again the following year with an 
altered plan and a new strategy. This new plan called for the 
consolidation of 170 state agencies into 69, ten of which would be 
cabinet agencies immediately, with three more to be added over the 
next two years. Notably, the governor's authority to appoint and 
remove the cabinet agency directors was absolute and his authority to 
appoint and remove the board/commission membership for the 
noncabinet agencies was expanded substantially. 
Strategically the House leadership, with the support of the 
Governor, decided to link the restructuring statutes and the 
appropriations bill. While restructuring would be addressed in separate 
legislation, the appropriations bill also would be drafted to reflect the 
restructured entities. Should the former fail, the latter would necessarily 
prevail, if there was to be a budget at all. The strategy proved 
successful and on June 18, 1993, the bill was signed into law·. 
Campbell had little time during his final term to accomplish more than 
the realignment of the restructured entities, but his successor, David M. 
Beasley (1995-present) would wield cabinet government as an 
authoritative instrument of gubernatorial control. 
Beasley, a young attorney and banker from the Pee Dee area, had 
previously served as the Speaker pro tempore in the S.C. House of 
Representatives. He was supported in his election bid by Campbell's 
political organization, the Christian Coalition, and the majority of the 
business establishment within the state. From the inaugural address 
through the first 18 months in office, his administration appeared 
committed to two imperatives: expanding the economic vitality and 
growth of the state and realizing a larger role in the governance 
process. 
His approach to cabinet governance has been most evidently 
reflected in three areas: appointments, the development of 
"subcabinets", and the coordination of cabinet agency functions through 
the governor's staff. All three underscore the primacy of accountability 
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and control, but they also highlight some of the difficulties attendant to 
moving a cumbersome bureaucracy in a coordinated and purposeful 
direction. 
The appointment of the Beasley administration cabinet was a 
studious process. All prospective candidates for director and deputy 
director positions were extensively screened, and for at least two 
cabinet posts, extensive national searches were conducted. The finalists 
were subjected to an extensive series of interviews with the governor's 
staff, selected external substantive area experts and ultimately with the 
Governor himself. Such a process appears routine given the 
conventional norms of business and government. In South Carolina, 
however, the route to an agency directorship had customarily required 
tenacity and seniority, and these selection standards were extraordinary 
in their thoroughness. 
The development of the subcabinet concept was even more 
unconventional. Not content with simply structuring cabinet meeting 
and processes, Beasley immediately installed a series of analytical 
teams formed around substantive policy area groupings within the 
cabinet. The intention was to coordinate public policy and programs 
with similar missions and goals, irrespective of where they might 
institutionally reside. A residual benefit of the subcabinet approach has 
been the reduction of intra-cabinet rivalry and an increased 
understanding of shared responsibility across agency boundaries. 
Finally, the administration's consolidation and coordination of 
cabinet agency lobbying and public affairs through the governor's staff 
has essentially solidified control in two vital areas-legislative and press 
relations. The governor's own staff crafts the message for these 
sensitive constituencies, and they ensure that the information is both 
consistent and palatable politically. 
These changes, and many more modest ones which extend from 
those articulated above, have revitalized the role of the governor in 
South Carolina. Table Two provides a pre- and post-transformation 
analysis of the more substantial gubernatorial authorities and powers. 
Beyond the events described above, however, there are other, more 
intrinsic reasons for these changes in the role of the South Carolina 
chief executive. One of the more compelling explanations may reside 
with the shifting trends in the political culture of the state itself. 
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Authoritv/Power<Y ear\ 
Appointment (! 993) 
Removal (1993) 
Tenure (1981) 
Budget authority (1993) 
Table Two 
Gubernatorial Authorities and Powers: 
Pre- and Post-Transform ation 
Pre-Transformation 
Approx . 1,500 state and regional 
appis; controlled 12 agencies 
indirectly through lay boards 
Limited removal of board appts. 
for cause 
A single four year term; 
ineligible for reelection to a 
consecutive term 
Proposed budget as chairman of 
5 person Budget and Control Bd. 
Post Transformatio n 
Approx . 1,500 state and 
reg . appts. ;appoinlS the 
directors of 13 cabinet 
agencies; controls another 8 
agencies through lay boards 
All appointees, except 
regulatory commissioners, 
serve at the pleasure of the 
governor 
Eligible for reelection to a 
second consecutive term 
Statutory authority to submit 
executive budget proposal 
for all agencies, cabinet and 
noncabinet 
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Mired in the Traditionalistic Culture 
The model of the impotent executive which dominated in the state 
for the first two centuries probably evolved from any number of 
antecedents: the colonial fear of the king's tyranny, the legislature's 
regard for a stronger executive as a zero sum game power proposition, 
perhaps even concerns over mirroring a Federal presidential role. 
Whatever the reasons and imagined provocations, two centuries of a 
powerless executive served to institutionalize and even venerate the 
legislative state. By the first half of the twentieth century, South 
Carolina's governor was not only a hollow vestige of authority, but the 
office has been rendered a cultural relic. 
In American Federalism, Daniel J. Elaza.r argues that there are 
three major types of American political culture: traditionalistic, 
individualistic, and moralistic. 16 Each culture emanates from a variety 
of ethnic, religious , political and sociological dispositions and 
expectations of a populace and may vary according to geographic 
section and region. 
The traditionalistic culture is distinctly Southern in origin. This 
culture involves a citizenry, generally depicted as undereducated and 
lacking in initiative, deferring to a elitist social hierarchy. 
Governmental structures are paternalistic, and enormous emphasis is 
placed on preserving the status quo. Political processes are not overtly 
competitive in that the hierarchy, both social and political, is 
entrenched and well defined with seniority being the definitive factor 
in determining political ascendency. 
The individualistic culture derives from the mid-Atlantic states and 
views politics and political processes as market commodities. Political 
values and resources are accepted or rejected according to their merit 
and viability. Thus ideas, including strategies for change, may be 
"bought, sold, or traded" according to their competitive appeal. The 
individualistic culture places a high premium upon political options and 
policy choice. Of course, implicit in this reasoning is an informed and 
responsible electorate. 
The third political culture, the moralistic, stems from a New 
England orientation. This culture encompasses attitudes and opinions 
predicated upon a sense of civic responsibility or common good. It is 
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inherently moralistic in that it ascribes "higher value" reasoning to 
political participation. Somewhat tautologically, increased participation 
in the political process serves to spread this sense of civic responsibility 
and is most desirous. 
Elazar's traditionalistic culture merits examination regarding its 
ability to explain South Carolina's historic legislative-executive 
imbalance. Most assuredly, the true bastion of state power, the General 
Assembly, had been a rigidly structured political and social hierarchy 
with service longevity being the imperative for promotion. 
With regard to the paternalistic attributes oflegislative rule, V.O. 
Key described the role of the legislature, particularly the Senate, in the 
"natural" order of the state: 
Such is the formal allocation of governmental powers 
in South Carolina: a weak executive, a legislature that 
takes a hand in the management of administrative 
departments, and a legislature whose county 
delegations, with the senator a kingpin, in effect, 
govern their respective counties. And within the state 
the position of the legislature is accorded due 
recognition. To a higher degree than elsewhere in 
the South, public attention-as measured by 
newspaper coverage and by observation of the 
attitudes of politicians over the region-is focused on 
the legislature, where, as between the two houses, the 
senate holds primacy. And the senate regards itself as 
something of a gentleman's club, not without reason 
for South Carolina senators are a cut-a broad 
cut-above above the usual run of state legislators. 17 
The governor, in spite of the deference afforded him in the 
ceremonial exercise of his office, was not a member of the legislative 
cabal and was entitled to only a modicum of true power. Moreover, the 
General Assembly was far too attentive to legislative business to 
concern itself with the chief executive. Speaker Emeritus Sol Blatt in 
a revealing interview in 1982 acknowledged that in 50 years of state 
service, he had only visited the governor's office six times when he 
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was not invited. 18 Most commonly, what attention the governor was 
afforded was addressed to "that fellow downstairs" in floor debate. 19 
Nor could the governor capitalize on partisan politics. Because 
state politics were effectively one party Democrat politics until well into 
the 1970's, governors lacked the platform and the audience naturally 
provided through partisan sparring. Ferrol Sams, Jr. retells a joke from 
the pre-World War II era which illustrates the political solidarity and 
intolerance in the Deep South at that time. It involves a rural school 
teacher leading her students through tutorial exercises: 
"Children, who paved the road in front of your 
house?" 
In response, the chorus, "Roosevelt!" 
"Who put electricity in your house for you?" 
"Roosevelt!" 
Who gave your uncle a job in the WP A?" 
"Roosevelt!" 
Who got your grand daddy an old age pension?" 
"Roosevelt!" 
"All right, children. Now. Who made you?" 
After a moment of silence one little boy asserted 
stoutly, "God." 
Whereupon a gallused, barefoot towhead leaped up in 
the back row and yelled, "Throw that sorry 
Republican out of here. "20 
Clearly, the pre-transformation model of executive authority in 
South Carolina was an artifact of a traditionalistic culture. The 
legislature was the paternalistic influence, and there was little tolerance, 
or need, for a competing force. Political processes were simple, and 
politics were pursued according to a set of well understood rules, the 
majority of which were embedded in legislative ritual and the seniority 
system. 
Attempting to explain the post-transformation model is more 
problematic. For the first two centuries, it is reasonable to argue that 
paternalistic politics were a function of static norms and a traditional 
culture. However, any effort to explain political change, be it of 
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process or culture or both, should necessarily involve an ordering of 
the causality. In this effort, the explanation becomes more tenuous. 
Most assuredly, the past 15 years have seen the emergence of the 
individualistic and moralistic cultures in South Carolina politics. And 
clearly the executive institution has served as both a catalyst and a 
symbol for perpetuating these cultures in competition with the 
traditionalistic culture. What is uncertain is the extent to which 
governors have effectively opened processes to affect a marketplace of 
competing ideologies and ideas (individualistic) and forced a more 
expansive definition of the common good (moralistic). Or rather have 
these cultures developed independently through the gradual political 
maturation of a populace with the chief executive as the principal 
beneficiary? 
More anecdotal support exists for the first view: that post-1980 
governors have challenged the traditionalistic culture and provided the 
other competing cultures a responsive forum. Should this be the case, 
the power debate will be enjoined well into the next decade. As future 
governors proselytize for more sympathetic and progressive cultures, 
they will continue to campaign against the political orthodoxy which 
built and sustained one of the last, great legislative states. 
Luther F . Carter , is on leave from the University of Charleston and is serving 
as Executive Director of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board 
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